BRICS has emerged as one of the most prominent symbols of an evolving multipolar world, gaining greater demographic, economic and political weight after expanding from five members to eleven. Its calls for reforming global institutions, reducing dependence on Western financial systems and amplifying the Global South’s voice have given the grouping influence well beyond its membership.

Yet expansion has also sharpened a central contradiction. BRICS has grown more powerful as a political symbol, but its ability to act collectively has become increasingly constrained by competing national interests, strategic rivalries and the absence of a binding institutional framework.

A Grouping Without The Structures Of An Alliance

BRICS is neither a military alliance nor a free-trade bloc. It has no mutual-defence obligations, common currency or treaty-based institutional structure comparable to those of NATO or the European Union.

Instead, the grouping operates as an informal coordination mechanism built around consensus and a rotating presidency. Its political significance is considerable, but it lacks institutions capable of enforcing collective decisions or requiring members to subordinate national priorities to a common agenda.

This arrangement was easier to manage when BRICS had five members and a relatively limited set of shared objectives. The challenge has grown substantially as the expanded grouping attempts to address a far broader agenda, including climate finance, artificial intelligence, sanctions, terrorism and international conflicts.

There is no BRICS equivalent of NATO’s Article 5, no executive commission responsible for implementing collective decisions and no treaty-based mechanism for settling disputes between members.

As a result, reaching consensus often becomes an end in itself rather than the foundation for coordinated policy.

National Interests Frequently Override Collective Messaging

The limitations of BRICS’ informal structure were evident during the 2023 Johannesburg summit.

Russian President Vladimir Putin participated remotely because of an International Criminal Court warrant, while Chinese President Xi Jinping unexpectedly skipped a major business forum, with his remarks delivered by a representative.

Neither development disrupted the summit itself, but both highlighted the extent to which domestic and national considerations can override the grouping’s collective political presentation.

As BRICS grows, the difficulty lies not necessarily in maintaining the organisation’s existence, but in ensuring that its growing political symbolism is matched by strategic coherence.

Security Cooperation Limited By Internal Rivalries

The sharpest example of this contradiction is found in the field of international security. BRICS regularly adopts statements on security issues, but its members do not share a uniform understanding of regional or global threats.

The relationship between India and China illustrates the challenge. The deadly border clash between the two countries in 2020 exposed deep strategic mistrust between BRICS’ two principal Asian powers.

Although their relationship has subsequently moved towards a cautious thaw, including disengagement arrangements and renewed diplomatic engagement, India has maintained that broader cooperation remains linked to peace and stability along the disputed border.

The continuing strategic competition between New Delhi and Beijing makes it difficult to view BRICS as a fully cohesive geopolitical bloc.

Differences Extend To Terrorism And Global Conflicts

The absence of common positions is also evident in the grouping’s approach to major international crises.

On terrorism, BRICS members have often been able to agree on broad condemnations but have faced greater difficulty over attributing responsibility.

The 2025 Rio declaration strongly condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attack and referred to safe havens, but did not name a state sponsor.

On the war in Ukraine, India and China have called for negotiated settlements, but neither country possesses the institutional means within BRICS to compel Russia to alter its military course.

The grouping can articulate diplomatic positions on peace and security, but it lacks the mechanisms required to translate such statements into enforceable collective action.

Economic Cooperation Faces Structural Limits

BRICS has made more progress in economic cooperation than some of its critics acknowledge.

The New Development Bank is operational, while member countries are examining greater use of local currencies, cross-border payment interoperability and mechanisms that could reduce exposure to Western-controlled financial systems.

However, reducing dependence on the US dollar is not the same as creating a viable alternative global monetary system.

BRICS does not have a free-trade agreement, and its members have put aside any immediate plans to introduce a common currency.

China’s Economic Weight Creates Another Challenge

A further constraint is the significant economic imbalance within the grouping, where China remains the dominant economic power.

For countries such as India and Brazil, the objective of reducing reliance on the US dollar does not necessarily extend to creating a new form of systemic dependence on Beijing.

This has shaped India’s approach to proposals involving digital currency and cross-border payment systems. New Delhi has presented currency interoperability primarily as a means of improving transactional efficiency rather than as an ideological effort to replace the dollar.

The difference reflects a broader divide within BRICS over the ultimate purpose of economic cooperation.

Different Members See BRICS Differently

The grouping’s relationship with the United States is another source of divergence.

For China and Russia, BRICS can serve as an instrument for challenging aspects of the US-led international order.

India, Brazil and South Africa, however, have generally approached the grouping as a platform for diversification and for securing greater influence for the Global South rather than as a vehicle for direct confrontation with the West.

India continues to emphasise strategic autonomy, strengthening its engagement with the United States and the Quad while simultaneously maintaining close ties with Russia and participating in BRICS.

Brazil and South Africa have similarly sought greater representation and influence for developing countries without necessarily endorsing a wider confrontation with Western powers.

Expansion Adds Influence And More Veto Points

Expansion remains both BRICS’ greatest political achievement and one of its most significant institutional challenges.

The inclusion of additional powers from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia has given the grouping a wider geographical reach and greater international weight.

At the same time, expansion has brought more regional rivalries and divergent strategic interests into an organisation that depends entirely on consensus.

Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not share an identical security outlook, while India and China continue to pursue competing strategic visions in Asia.

Every additional member strengthens BRICS’ global reach, but also adds another national interest that must be accommodated before consensus can be achieved.

A Powerful Symbol Still Searching For Cohesion

BRICS cannot be dismissed as an organisation without influence, nor can it yet be regarded as a unified anti-American bloc.

Its greatest strength lies in its ability to express widespread dissatisfaction with elements of the existing global order. Its members broadly agree that institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the UN Security Council require reform and that excessive reliance on a single financial system can create strategic vulnerabilities.

However, identifying weaknesses in the existing international architecture is considerably easier than reaching agreement on the institutions and systems that should replace or reform it.

BRICS has acquired scale, political momentum and a significant global platform. What it still lacks is the institutional framework needed to turn diverse national ambitions into sustained collective action.

Until it develops stronger mechanisms capable of bridging its internal differences, BRICS is likely to remain a powerful expression of a multipolar world rather than a fully coherent instrument for building one.

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