Bangladesh Army chief General Waker-uz-Zaman is scheduled to make his first official foreign visit to China by the end of June 2025. The trip, following a formal invitation from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has triggered diplomatic concerns in New Delhi as it signals deepening military ties between Dhaka and Beijing.
The visit comes at a sensitive time, especially after General Zaman reportedly communicated to the interim government, led by Chief Adviser Mohammad Yunus, his opposition to any “humanitarian corridor” into Myanmar’s Rakhine State—a development that could impact regional humanitarian coordination involving India.
While formal details of General Zaman’s itinerary are still being finalised by various directorates within the Bangladesh Army, the visit is clearly centered on expanding military hardware cooperation with China—Bangladesh’s principal defence supplier. Coordination is being overseen by the Directorate of Weaponry and Systems (DWE&S), with input from key branches including Artillery, Army Aviation, Armoured Corps, Signals and Intelligence.
On May 13, top Bangladeshi defence officials, including Major General Abu Bakar Siddique Khan, held discussions with executives of China Vanguard Co Ltd over the potential acquisition of advanced Chinese military systems, including HQ-17AE surface-to-air missiles, FK-3 medium-range SAMs and JSG radar systems. Although it remains unclear whether formal agreements will be signed during General Zaman’s visit, sources indicate that high-level talks on broadening defence cooperation are on the agenda.
A growing military relationship: Past engagements with China
The visit also builds on growing military engagement between the two countries. In 2024, China and Bangladesh held their first joint military exercise, Golden Friendship-2024, focused on peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. There have also been reports of Chinese military technology transfers to Bangladeshi facilities such as the Bangladesh Ordnance Factories and Machine Tools Factory, aimed at fostering a domestic defence industry.
Notably, in 2016, China delivered two refurbished Type 035G Ming-class submarines to the Bangladesh Navy, now stationed at Pekua, near Chittagong. China has also conducted goodwill naval visits, with two PLA warships docking at Chittagong in October 2024.
India’s unease has deepened further after Yunus’ visit to Beijing in March 2025, during which he reportedly offered China a proposal to develop the old airbase at Lalmonirhat—located near the Indian border. While the Bangladesh Air Force is exploring options to acquire Chinese J-10C or JF-17 fighter aircraft, some factions within its leadership are said to prefer European alternatives such as the Eurofighter Typhoon. However, the offer to redevelop Lalmonirhat has sparked apprehension in New Delhi about the strategic use of such infrastructure.
India’s Strategic Concerns and Regional Implications
“India views the growing Bangladesh-China defence relationship as a potential security challenge in South Asia, particularly given the proximity of military installations to its eastern border and the geopolitical implications of China’s deepening military footprint in the Bay of Bengal region,” said an official of Union government’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
As General Zaman’s visit draws closer, diplomatic observers in India are closely monitoring the outcomes, particularly any new defence pacts or infrastructure deals that could further entrench China’s influence in a region critical to India’s strategic interests.
